The quantification of uncertainty is a key topic in different theories and accounts of the legal process, ranging from probabilism to explanationism. These accounts invoke probability to various extents. For legal probabilism, probability is the single core concept, whereas other accounts, such as the relative plausibility theory, give it a more limited role, as one consideration among others. At the same time, controversies persist about the nature of probability and the value it may add to the understanding of the broad range of aspects that characterise the legal process. These controversies arise, in part, from the fact that probability itself is the object of confusing debates in many scientific disciplines. In view of these intricacies, this paper argues that the critical analysis and clarification of how to understand and use probability meaningfully remains a topic worthy of investigation across different theoretical perspectives. The first part of this paper critically examines a selection of persisting misconceptions about probability and objections against its use, based on discussions presented in recent evidence law literature. Part II of this paper will blend this discussion with a particular view of probability, interpreted as a personal decision, rarely acknowledged in legal literature. Using a multidisciplinary perspective and a thorough review of historical sources, we illustrate and discuss how the understanding of probability assertion as a decision promotes transparency, honesty, accountability and justifiability. This decisional perspective is further developed and discussed in Part III to show that its logical ingredients underpin key concepts of different theoretical accounts, in particular the assertion of degrees of belief, assessments of relative plausibility and verdicts about ultimate issues at trial. Overall, the paper makes the point that the isolated debates over probability, legal probabilism and reasoning under uncertainty misconceive the primary problem of the legal process, which is decision-making under uncertainty. The proposed decisional perspective clarifies these issues both analytically and descriptively, and resolves divergencies between ostensibly competing concepts such as probability and relative plausibility.
Introduction
Doctrine and policy on evidentiary proof processes in criminal and civil cases, across modern legal systems, commonly invoke the understanding that decision makers 1 ought to consider the degree to which they are convinced that particular legal elements are established, before making a decision. In a given case, decision makers need to address the question of whether they are sufficiently persuaded to decide in favour of a given party. The exact level of persuasion required -the standard of proof -applicable in a given case is an intricate evidentiary topic. While legal systems appear to leave it largely to decision makers to determine when a given level of proof is achieved in the case at hand, or a quantum of evidence was provided, 2 there is a broad scope of legislation, jurisprudence and academic writing on how this level of satisfaction should be reached. On the one hand, notions such as "preponderance of the evidence" (or "balance of probabilities") in civil cases, and "beyond a reasonable doubt" in criminal cases, are commonly explained in overtly probabilistic terms. 3 On the other hand, attempts by evidence scholars to provide a rigorously probabilistic account of standards of proof face a number of challenges and are the subject of decades-long debates. 4 In a recent paper, Professors Allen and Pardo 5 review several accounts of the nature of juridical proof and argue in favour of a relative plausibility account (also called 'explanatory account'). Unlike approaches that Alex Biedermann is the corresponding author.consider probability as a starting point to capture selected aspects of the legal proof process, Allen and Pardo start from the litigation process as a whole, and how it structures proof at trial. In a second step, they consider how relative plausibility, empirically and descriptively, fits with the legal system's goals. Adherents of relative plausibility are not dismissive of probability, however, because they consider probability to be one of the variables that inform judgments, among others aspects such as consistency, completeness and economy. 6 But if probability has to play a role in evidential assessment and juridical proof, as this view suggests, then the proper understanding of probability is essential. This is an intricate topic mainly because probability itself is a controversial topic across scientific disciplines. Thus, the critical analysis, discussion and, if possible, resolution, of objections recurrently levelled against legal probabilism is a topic worthy of investigation for both adherents of the relative plausibility theory of trial and probabilistic-centred proponents of the trial rationale.
In the first part of this paper, we critically review and discuss a selection of misconceptions of probability and objections against its use in legal settings observed in recent evidence law literature. Although several of these critiques have been formulated and known for a long time, the replies offered hitherto by evidence scholars and discussants from other domains, such as philosophy of science, appear to remain unconsidered or are felt to be unconvincing. In Section two of this paper, we seek to improve on this situation by building on de Finetti's operational and decision-oriented perspective to probability. 7 This is an unconventional account of probability and sceptical readers might immediately object to this framework as being incompatible with the values of the legal process, essentially because of the allegedly unconstrained subjectivist probability assignments that this perspective allows. We will explain in detail why this is a misconception of the personalist account of probability. Specifically, we will defend the view that the proper understanding of the personalist account actually encourages highly desirable values such as transparency, honesty, accountability and justifiability. We will substantiate this view with the help of a conceptual device that is based on the understanding of probability assertion as a personal decision, requiring careful reflection and the taking of responsibility. Further, we will argue that the debates over the suitability and nature of probability (objectivist, subjectivist or otherwise) in the legal setting distract from the principal issue and duty with which the legal process is concerned, which is decision under uncertainty. In Section three of this paper, we show that -conceptually -the notion of decision underpins key concepts ranging from the expression of degrees of belief in terms of either probability or plausibility, to verdicts at the end of the process. In this last Section, we will discuss the analytical character of the proposed decisional perspective and distinguish it from its descriptive capacity. That is, our focus is not primarily on whether the formal approach to decision developed here provides a good description of how participants in the legal process actually behave. Instead, as we will argue, the decisional account captures the logical structure and inevitable ingredients of the decisional questions that any person required to act under uncertainty faces, irrespective of whether those actions are based on probability or on other concepts, as comprised in relative plausibility. As an aside, our analyses will also make the point that the mainstream debates over probability thresholds as bases for decisions are conceptually short-sighted and, in this regard, rightly criticized. The decisional account that we invoke clarifies why both, analytically and descriptively, sensible decision-making is not based on probability alone.
Methodologically, our paper is multidisciplinary. It critically examines the use of formal methods of decision analysis in the law, based on a careful interpretation of their historical sources. This will lead us to refer frequently to the writings of Professors Allen and Pardo because they are a primary source of serious challenges on this topic.
We insist on delineating this paper as focusing on probability, not on Bayes' theorem, and even less on Bayesianism. Pure probabilists may view these distinctions as artificial because Bayes' theorem is nothing but an inevitable consequence of the rules of probability. There is a difference, however, on a practical level. The full application of Bayes' theorem in the legal context -also referred to as 'judicial Bayesianism' 8 -faces a host of challenges, ranging from the specification of relevance relationships (i. e. conditionalization), to the assessment of component probabilities and the limitations in computational capacities at the level of detail that the theory stipulates. A moderate probabilistic account, 9 such as the one envisioned here, is primarily concerned with the coherent expression of uncertainties about target events in terms of probabilities. It is more readily defensible and admitted also by critics. As such, it is an important preliminary of judicial Bayesianism but also other approaches, such as relative plausibility, that reserves at least a limited role to probability, among other considerations. 10 Thus, our concern here is only the nature and feasibility of probability assessments, regardless of whether they are direct assessments at the end point of an analysis, or component probability assessments that are either processed further using Bayes' theorem (by those who wish to take this additional step), 11 or used as parts of other accounts, such as relative plausibility. 12 2 Misconceptions regarding the nature of probability and recurrent objections against its use in the legal setting
Probability: The problem of where to start
In a recent paper, Dahlmann 13 addresses the issue of how a coherent legal reasoner ought to set initial probabilities -commonly called 'prior probabilities' -about competing propositions of interest advanced by opposing parties at trial. The terms 'initial' and 'prior' are often used interchangeably to clarify that the probabilities under consideration refer to the view of the decision maker before acquiring new evidence. The feasibility of conceptually defining and defensibly assigning such probabilities is widely considered a key factor on which hinges the suitability of probability for dealing with uncertainty in the legal process. 14 The opening statement of Dahlmann's paper provides a good example of a series of convoluted topics that require careful discussion: "A Bayesian assessment of the probability that the defendant in a criminal trial is guilty depends on the presumed base rate for guilt and the estimated likelihoods of the evidence." 15 To scrutinise the foundations of this statement, it is first necessary to recall the formal relationship between a proposition (or, hypothesis) H and an item of evidence E. Generally, the observation of an item of evidence E may strengthen, weaken or leave one's belief in the truth of the proposition H unaffected, depending on the probative value of E. 16 However, the diagnosticity of the evidence E, by itself, does not entitle us to make an assertion about the probability of the proposition H. Coherently working out a probability for the proposition H given evidence E, using the rules of the probability calculus, requires a prior probability of H, i. e. a probability without the conditioning on E. How to specify this probability in legal applications is the question that Dahlmann strives to answer, although there are several complications in his attempt.
To start with, he refers to the prior probability as the base rate. This is a particular, but ill-conceived, definitional choice. As we will point out, it is at the heart of a host difficulties commonly ascribed to the probabilistic account of judicial proof.
The notion of base rate relates to contexts in which the particular case to be assessed is thought of within the broader picture of background incidences of events of a comparable kind. Most typically, in medical diagnosis, the assessment of the probability that a particular person has a given disease, once the result of a diagnostic test has been obtained, requires one to take into account the prevalence of the disease in the population of interest. This, in turn, raises a plethora of interrogations about whether, and if so, how, relevant populations ought to be defined. This is generally known, legal literature included, as the 'reference class problem'. 17, 18 Difficulties increase -to the point of becoming unmanageable -whenever one considers highly particular combinations of target features, which is all too common in real legal cases. 19 While these are valid challenges that demonstrate a "deep conceptual problem" 20 , it is important to recall that they are the consequence of a particular way to interpret and assess probabilities, and not -as we will argue throughout this paper -a problem of probability as such. This is not to say that base rates are not a relevant concept in a variety of settings, such as clinical practice. 21 It is relevant to inquire, however, whether they have any bearing on the inferences and decision problems encountered in legal cases. In its most general form the notion of base rate relates to the proportion of members of a given population that have a particular trait. It involves two ideas: (i) relative frequency, i. e. the number of times a particular observation is made, divided by the total number of observations, and (ii) long-run repetitions of particular experiments under the idealised assumption of stable (i. e. identical) conditions. 22 In the last decades, these ideas have been used in attempts to define and apply probability in general, and in the law in particular. The persistence of these attempts is rather surprising, especially in more recent literature, because there are several well-grounded criticisms, known for a long time and to date unrefuted. In the legal literature, for example, Kaplan noted:
Given a typical contested trial, for instance, it is meaningless to speak of the probability of the defendant's guilt in terms of the number of times he would be guilty in an infinite number of exactly similar cases because, first, there are not even two exactly similar cases, and, second, even if there were many identical cases the court must reach a verdict, not a ratio, in the case at bar. 23 Similarly, Friedman observed: "Matters at issue in litigation tend to be one-time events. If Victor was murdered, it makes no sense to say, 'The probability that in any given murder of Victor the murderer would be Dennis is 1 in 2'." 24 The mathematical and statistical literature is in line with these views. 25 The assertion that "the probability that the defendant in a criminal trial is guilty depends on the presumed base rate for guilt" 26 thus is conceptually and definitionally unsound, but there are even more fundamental problems than trying to understand probability as a question of framing the relevant class or population, and the frequency of occurrence of selected features. Specifically, and we note this as an aside, it is unsound to refer to a 'probability of guilt' (or a "guilt-hypothesis" 27 ) because guilt is not a hypothesis, but a legal conclusion. 28 This renders the attempt to conceive of a way to "determining the base rate rate of guilt" 29 pointless.
Sure, probabilistic inference about any hypothesis of interest requires a probability to start from. The rules of probability say that one cannot make an assertion about the probability of a hypothesis, given particular evidence, without stating what one's probability was before considering the evidence. The rules of probability do not require, however, one to determine the initial probability "according to some uniform recipe" 30 , especially not in some frequentist way. What is more, thinking that one could elaborate principles and abstract procedures that claim to produce probabilities from scratch, that is without reference to particular information, is epistemologically objectionable. 31 It follows from the above considerations that it is not meaningful to conceptualise a prior probability in the legal context in terms of a base rate. It might be objected that there are situations where base rates are available, such as in the following example: "Suppose, e. g. that a defendant was driving on a road where 60 % of the drivers were intoxicated at the time when the defendant was stopped by the police. This would set the base rate for guilt at 0.60 (…)". 32 The critical point here is the transition from the first to the second of the previous two sentences, which is not one of necessity. Strictly speaking, the 60 % figure is data only. It is to be distinguished from the probability that a particular individual is indeed drunk, which is a distinct issue. 33 So, the question we are really interested in is the condition of a given individual or, to be more precise, our belief that this individual is in a particular state while having data on other individuals, supposedly comparable, in some sense, to the individual at hand. The key point is how to pin down this probability, because it does not follow directly from the available data. Lindley noted:
(…) you pass from a frequency among the patients seen, to a probability or belief about a further patient. This passage is so common that there has grown up a confusion between frequency, which refers to data, and probability, which is belief, so that people speak of the frequency interpretation of probability. There is a connection between the two concepts, but it is wrong to identify them (…). 34, 35 Underlying this distinction is an alternative view of probability that interprets probabilities as measures of degrees of a person's belief, referred to hereafter as personal or subjective probabilities. This type of probability refers to a person's entirety of knowledge, rather than to a process that supposedly produces certain outcomes at a particular rate. The knowledge which conditions personal probabilities may, but need not necessarily, cover frequency data. It is thus possible to avoid the perceived inadequacies that derive from attempts to define and assess probabilities in terms of frequency data. In later sections of this paper, we will further build on and explain the fundamental difference between the definition and the assignment of probabilities. Although we recognize that personal probabilities face their own critiques, we will illustrate how to assess them in light of a broader framework wherein uncertainty measurement is understood as a decision.
Likelihood and probability are not synonyms
Legal scholarship on the use of probability in the law is further complicated by the confusion between likelihood and probability. Indeed, they are often treated as synonyms, or near synonyms. In everyday language, but also in the discourses of many learned scientists, saying that an outcome or event is 'likely' is often taken to mean that it is 'probable'. Dahlmann, for example, mentions "estimated likelihoods of the evidence" 36 and, more specifically, "the likelihood of a false positive, i. e. the probability that such a match would occur with (…) a randomly picked innocent person." 37 The difference between likelihood and probability is technically subtle, and conceptually important. From a formal point of view, the probability Pr of an event or outcome E conditional on hypothesis H, written Pr(E|H), is also referred to as the likelihood of H, given E, sometimes written L(H;E). The term likelihood relates to the hypothesis, though, not the evidence, which is why the above expressions 'likelihood of the evidence' are ambiguous. To further illustrate the distinction, let E denote the event of finding large and fresh bloodstains (with a DNA profile corresponding to that of the victim) on the jacket of a person of interest (POI), and H the proposition that the POI assaulted the victim. It appears fair to assert that the probability of observing E, the POI's jacket showing fresh bloodstains with a DNA profile corresponding to the victim, conditional on the POI being the person who assaulted the victim (H), is high. Let it be close to 1 for the sake of illustration, which is reasonable when the POI is arrested shortly after the assault. Thus, the likelihood of H given E, i. e. L(H;E), is high: the proposition H provides a good account of the findings E. But that does not mean that Pr(H|E), the probability of H (the POI being the offender) conditional on E is high, too. Only Pr(E|H) is. To help understand why this is so it is useful to consider that there may be other viable alternative propositions that also have a high likelihood. Consider, for example, the alternative proposition H' according to which the POI is not the offender, but is a good Samaritan who provided first aid to the victim. Under this conditional, the probability of the bloodstain evidence E may be high as well. That is, Pr(E|H') may also be close to 1. But again, this high likelihood of H' does not imply that H' is (highly) probable. Indeed, in the example here, the likelihoods of H and H', given E, are both high (i. e. close to 1), i. e. they both provide good accounts of the findings E, but clearly H and H' cannot be both highly probable (i. e. close to 1) for as this would lead to a total probability greater than 1, and hence violate the rules of probability. Stated another way, with likelihoods, the evidence is fixed, but the propositions vary. Using again the above example, the two conditional probabilities Pr(E|H) and Pr(E|H') feature the same evidence E under different conditionals, H and H', and are two likelihoods. This is commonly known among forensic scientists who refer to the ratio of the two conditional probabilities Pr(E|H) and Pr(E|H') as the likelihood ratio. 38 Inherent in this notion is that the term likelihood refers to a proposition H with respect to E, but not the reverse: i. e. there is no reference to a 'likelihood of the evidence E'.
More generally, the distinction between the likelihood of the proposition given evidence, and the probability of the same proposition conditional on the same evidence is important to raise awareness about what is known as the "fallacy of the transposed conditional", 39 described also in legal contexts. 40 A fallacious transposing of the conditional occurs, for example, when one equates the probability of observing a positive reaction to a diagnostic test if a person handled a certain substance (e. g. explosives) and the probability of the person having handled said substance if a positive reaction is observed. 41 Our point here is not to claim that the distinction between probability and likelihood is a safeguard against fallacious conclusions in general. Indeed, as argued by Sullivan, "[t] he difference between these concepts is too foreign and too esoteric for mere words to make any difference on their own." 42 Notwithstanding, it is a general hindrance to both legal research and practice if the underlying concepts are not properly distinguished.
Flat earth and moon landing: the myth of 'true' probabilities
There is one more salient topic in the expression "estimated likelihoods of the evidence" 43 . It has to do with the use of the terms 'estimate' and 'estimation', commonly used in sentences such as "a (…) probability of the guilthypothesis can be estimated". 44 Indeed, it is common to encounter expressions like 'estimating a probability' in everyday language, but again, complications are in the details, and their conceptual implications are far reaching. In this Section, we will point out why probabilities are not the object of 'estimation'.
Start by considering a situation in which the term 'estimation' is useful and appropriate: it is the case when there is a real quantity to discover. Take the example of the proportion of members in a target population that have a particular feature, such as a eye colour. In theory, it is possible to determine such a proportion by inspecting every member of the population, though this is time and resource consuming. 45 It is for this reason that scientists rely on the inspection of only a selected number of members of the population, in order to draw a conclusion about the population as a whole -in terms of an estimate. This bears no relationship, however, with a proposition such as 'the defendant is the offender'. 46 This proposition is either true or false. Here, probability merely serves as an expression for your (or, anybody's) uncertainty that this proposition is true. This probability can take any value between zero and one, but there is no 'true' or 'uniquely/objectively right' probability, i. e. your belief, that could somehow be 'estimated'. All that can be said is that the more you are sure that a given proposition is true, the higher your probability (i. e. close to one), and, conversely, the surer you are that the proposition is false, the smaller your probability (i. e. close to zero). Probability is a very liberal concept 47 in that it does not tell one what their probability should be (besides that it ought to be a number between zero and one). This property raises many concerns among legal and forensic science scholars that deserve careful consideration.
A main concern is that personally-assigned probabilities -commonly referred to as subjective probabilities -are prone to "abuse (…) to allow people to render opinions (…) on what is sometimes no better than a guess." 48 Similarly, Allen is concerned about "uncontrolled subjectivity" 49 and that probabilities "could be any numbers at all, and they need not be constrained in any way by the quality of the evidence". 50 Forensic scientists also show resistance against assessments "which are directly the result of subjective judgement". 51 These are valid concerns with respect to the liberal concept of probability and they merit careful attention.
We have elsewhere critically exposed what we termed "unconstrained subjectivism" 52 , i. e. an arbitrary and speculative use of probability to support "fanciful probability statements devoid of any meaningful justification". 53 This, however, is not how serious personal probabilists understand probability. 54 In this context, subjective does not mean arbitrary. Subjective probabilists invoke particular criteria to constrict arbitrary probability assignment. Specifically, there are two related, critically important notions -justification and conditioning information -that need to be considered in personal probabilities. 55 To illustrate, consider two examples. The first deals with the proposition that the earth is flat. 56 Suppose that you assign a high probability for this proposition to be true. This may seem like a silly example and, at first sight, could serve as perfect illustration that probability indeed supports fanciful statements. But, as Lindley notes, "there is nothing in our rules [of probability] to say you are wrong, merely that you are unusual (…)". 57 This leads to several points of reflection. First, we should ask why the assertion of a high probability for the proposition that the earth is flat seems inappropriate to us. Presumably, it seems inappropriate to us because of the overwhelming evidence we have to the contrary. 58 So, whenever we encounter a person who we think holds strange or unusual beliefs, we should question that person on her evidence. It may well be that the knowledge base of that person does not contain the same evidence as that available to us, that the person of interest may assess available evidence differently, or consider evidence only selectively. 59 But consider now a variation to this example and imagine a person back in ancient times, before the rise of Hellenistic astronomy. Given the evidence available at that time, it would not appear unusual to the casual observer to believe that the earth is flat: after all, her observations are limited to the perspective of a person standing on the earth with her two feet. When we judge the appropriateness of such a person's high probability for the event that the earth is flat, we need to keep in mind the conditioning information: today's body of knowledge is different from the one available in ancient times. Whatever the person's views are on the proposition of interest, probability is not at fault in any way -rather, it works just fine: it serves as a precise expression of what a given person thinks about the truth of a proposition of interest. And, in all cases -even when the assertions and beliefs seem obviously right -it is worthwhile to inquire about the foundations of probability assertions, i. e. how they are justified, and on which conditioning information they rely. 60 As a second example, consider the possibility of a manned mission to the moon in the near future. What is the probability of the successful arrival of a manned spacecraft on the surface of the moon? 61 Before addressing this question, we might wish to obtain some additional information, such as who is planning the mission. Is it an experienced and well-funded entity, such as NASA, or a small country, such as Liechtenstein, that has no experience in space exploration? Or, is it a private company? This example shows that we naturally inquire about the relevant conditioning information when assessing a probability, and that we care about this information to be thorough and trustworthy, in order for our probability assignment to be justifiable. But again, there is no single 'right' probability: the information available to an engineer involved in said space mission might well be different from the information available to the general public. It will not be surprising, thus, that the probabilities assigned to the proposition by engineers or members of the public will differ: while each opinion may be well justified in its own right, the conditioning information between different people will vary.
However, it may rightly be invoked that probability does not prevent a person from declaring a more extreme probability than what this person actually considers to be a suitable probability in the case at hand. 62, 63 It is for this reason that the notions of justification and conditioning information are powerful notions to help examine whether probability assessors are in possession of information that entitles them to their assertions, in law 64 as any other context of application.
The veil of robustness and endless regress
Related to the topic of justification of probability assertions are concerns about the extent of supporting information. Dahlmann notes:
A further problem with probability assessments that are based on insufficient reference data is that such assessments are 'un-robust'. That an assessment is un-robust means that it is likely that additional reference data would change the assessment significantly, and this is not acceptable. 65 These assertions confuse different issues.
First, while available information may vary to any extent, probability incorporates as much relevant information as is available. But, if there is limited information, this is not a fault or problem of probability, but merely reflects an intrinsic condition of the real world. 66 Even if one does not endorse probabilistic thinking, the issue of imperfect data will persist. The notion of justified probability assertion is useful in this context because it is transparent regarding its foundations and, thereby, informs discussants about the extent to which probabilities rely on data. In any case, decision makers preserve their liberty regarding how to act or proceed based on such probabilities.
Second, probability assessment is bound to systemic conditions, i. e. the properties of the context of application. As Allen insists, "[t]he law has to decide at the moment in question; it cannot suspend belief while a series of tests is conducted to see if anything useful emerges." 67 This leaves decision makers with no choice other than to make the best use of whatever relevant information is available at the time a decision needs to be made. As noted previously, probability is not a magic device that can 'produce' information out of nothing, it merely serves the purpose of expressing a person's uncertainty as a function of available data, however good or poor that data may be.
Third, invoking other data that might be observed, but that are not, is a typical concern of frequentist statistics that postulates that observations could conceivably have resulted in another set of data. 68 Underlying this concern is what Lindley 69 calls hindsight, which raises the question of how to look at ex ante assessments from an ex post data perspective. For example, it is commonly said that when new data suggest or favour propositions other than those endorsed ex ante, the previous opinion (or, probability) is incorrect or wrong. However, such critiques are misplaced because, by definition, a probability is conditioned on the information available at the time when the original assessment was made. It is pointless to criticize an assessment based on information that was unavailable to the probability assessor ex ante. The point of subsequently obtained data is not one of judging probabilities as being 'right' and 'wrong', or making a correction, but one of recognizing that a former probability assessment needs readjustment in the light of new information, leading to a new probability assignment. 70, 71 An outgrowth of concerns about the extent to which probabilities are supported by data are proposals of interval or second-order 72 probabilities. In a nutshell, these proposals seek to circumvent the difficulty of asserting a probability -as an expression of one's uncertainty -in terms of a single number. Recently, this has led to considerable controversy among forensic scientists, with some discussants insisting on the logic of understanding probability as a single number, 73 and others arguing to the contrary. 74 While, as per definition, probability is a single number -for different numbers express different states of uncertainty -the practical implementation of this definition at its full level of rigor may be difficult. However, it is not a viable solution then to merely add an additional level of technicality in terms of intervals or the like. Indeed, if one is not able to assign a single-valued probability in the first place, how is one to assign a probability, or an interval (requiring two values, an upper and a lower bound), over a probability? According to Lindley, this leads to an infinite regress 75 and confuses the measuring device (i. e. probability) with its application in practice. 76 
The struggle with the '(non-) knowledge' of probabilities
The concerns raised in the previous sections regarding ostensibly true and robust probabilities reveal a further question that is often raised in connection with the assertion of probabilities, in particular when they are hard to elicit: the issue of how one can 'know' probabilities, especially knowing which is the 'right' probability. Indeed, one often hears statements such as 'I don't know what the probability is', where the emphasis on 'the' suggests that there is a real and uniquely applicable -and hence potentially knowable -probability to be discovered. This may occur, for example, when one attempts to define and assess probabilities in terms of base rates, but one cannot provide or agree on the applicable reference classes, or one lacks suitable base rate data. But again, this confuses the assessment of probability with its definition. If one can agree on the view that probability is, in a most general sense, an observer's expression of the degree of belief that a particular uncertain event is true, depending on the specific information and knowledge available to that observer, then assertions of nonknowledge of probabilities turn out to be a "pseudo-problem". 77 According to this account, probabilities are an observer's justified position statements regarding events of any kind, hence asserting that one does not know one's probabilities would mean to say that one does not know one's states of mind (i. e. opinions):
Among the answers that do not make sense, and cannot be admitted, are the following: 'I do not know,' 'I am ignorant of what the probability is,' 'in my opinion the probability does not exist.' Probability (or prevision) is not something which in itself can be known or not known: It exists in that it serves to express, in a precise fashion, for each individual, his choice in his given state of ignorance. 78 The challenge, thus, does not rest with the concept of probability, but with limitations of one's commitment to the task of probability elicitation, or with external factors that prevent one from asserting probabilities. These factors are multiple and possibly interrelated, such as aversion against publicly exposing one's (probabilistic) view, and bearing the responsibility that comes with probability assertion. There may also be policy reasons or legal obligations that prevent one from the reliance on and exposure of relevant information, for example when it is proprietary.
The trap of murky propositions
Questionable elicitation targets, in the form of highly peculiar hypotheticals, are a further source of difficulties in assessing probabilities, and are often used in attempts to illustrate the limited suitability of personal probabilities. Vermeule, for instance, invoking an example drawn from Elster 79 , argues that questions such as whether "Norway in the year 3000 will be a democracy rather than a dictatorship" 80 lead to meaningless probabilities, devoid of any epistemic credentials.
It is true that there is nothing in probability theory that prevents one from giving a probability in reply to such a question, 81 and it may seem appalling that personal probabilists consider it feasible -in principle (though not necessarily straightforward) -to give a probability here. However, asserting a probability, even for strange propositions, does not found a criticism of probability. Sensible subjective probabilists might well invoke that they do not wish to declare a probability because of the nature of the question asked and the intricacy of the domain of expertise on which they are consulted -rendering justified probability assignments for the case at hand too challenging.
Thus, the difficulty relies in the real-world problem under study, not with the chosen analytical framework of thinking. As noted by Friedman, probability "(…) is a flexible template. It can take into account as much complexity as its user is able to handle", 82 and, to which we can add, that the user is willing and feels able to defend. What is more, Friedman argues, 83 the theory would indeed have limited value, and lack comprehensiveness, if it did not -in principle -allow us to contemplate any real-world proposition, however peculiar and difficult to assess it may be. In this sense, there is nothing inherently wrong with asserting a personal probability for the 'Norway proposition' as long as all the discussants are clear about the idiosyncrasy of the elicitation target (i. e. an event in the far future) and the limitations in the available knowledge and expertise required to appropriately address the question under scrutiny. As an aside, it is also clear that resorting to other types of probability, such as frequentist or base rate inspired interpretations, would not be an option. Among the remaining alternatives would be not to opine on the question of interest, though we have mentioned previously that in legal contexts, fact-finders do not have the liberty to delay action.
Intermediate summary: From abstract definitions to probability as a decision
The above sections have raised and discussed a number of recurrent, but by no means exhaustive, criticisms of probability. The objections we have reviewed appear to be influenced by a frequentist definition of probability. We have seen that attempts to apply this definition of probability runs into operational difficulties. These range from the definition and availability of relevant data for a case at hand to conflicts with principles and values of the legal process. Specifically, we have identified as one source of difficulty the fact that classic (i. e. frequentist) pursuits of probability conflate the definition of probability with its assignment. This has led us to provisionally favour the counter-position according to which probability is a person's individual assessment of uncertainty regarding any event, conditioned on whatever data and knowledge is available to this person at the time uncertainty is (probabilistically) quantified.
This interpretation of probability as belief is neither a new or an original standpoint, nor is it free from attracting its own objections. Among the chief objections is the concern that the liberal concept of probability which, in a strict sense, places only limited constraints on probability assertions (i. e. coherence requirements), can induce people to assert any probabilities they wish, without any epistemic warrants. In § 2.3 we argued that such unconstrained probabilism, albeit a valid concern, does not correspond to how serious probabilists understand personal probability. They consider that the liberal concept of probability comes at the price of responsibility that must be assumed.
In the remaining sections of this paper, we shall illustrate how an individual's sense for responsible probability assertion can formally be incentivised. We will do so by relying on a particular concept, to be explained in due course, which mirrors probability through the way in which a given individual is prepared to act under uncertainty, given their best knowledge. The rationale for this methodological choice derives from an analogy with the burden of decision at other instances of the legal process. Conclusions regarding ultimate issues, for example, are -by their nature -questions of decision which ought to be argumentatively well grounded. Similarly, we will argue, one can interpret the sensible assertion of a probability regarding an intermediate uncertain proposition as a decision. That is, an individual decides which probability to assert in any given instance, by making the best use of the entirety of the available knowledge and information, and by aiming to appraise reality as defensibly as possible.
3 The decisionalization of probability
The possibility of measuring uncertainty using a standard
Unlike accounts that seek to conceptualise probability in terms of abstract and impersonal notions (e. g. secondary concepts such as reference classes, base rates, etc.), we shall start the presentation of the decisional perspective of probability by placing the individual in the centre of our analysis. This does not deny the view that factfinders ought to be disinterested individuals, and the court be "a disinterested forum", 84 instructed to pursue legal proceedings as "the disinterested application of common sense" 85 including "all the necessary forms-deductive, inductive, abductive statistical-as necessary or appropriate". 86 The point of interest here is the uncontested fact that all legal trials place decision-making at their centre, an activity that is fundamentally directed by individuals, mandated to implement societal values. The choice of an analytical framework should thus properly account for this reality. The person-centric approach precisely characterises this view "(…) for it describes a real situation of a subject, or observer, contemplating a world, rather than talking about a world divorced from the observers living in it, as do some sciences." 87 However, before we proceed with exposing the decisional perspective to probability, it is necessary to address one more intricacy. It deals with the question of whether, and if so, how, appraisals of uncertainty can be given a clear, firm and measurable structure -an aim that the proclaimed objectivistic approaches based on single notions, such as base rates, attempt to do. Because, for a concept to be tractable and scientifically sound, one should be able to measure it, using numbers -at least conceptually. 88 The property of measurability is based on the feasibility of comparisons, a notion that is commonly known and recognised by many cognitive concepts, beyond probability. For example, the relative plausibility account involves qualitative assessments such as "(…) the common sense judgement that some explanations are on occasion considerably better, not just better, than others" 89 . Similarly, probabilists make comparative statements of the kind 'I am less sure that event A holds rather than event B', where A and B are propositions about which the individual has incomplete knowledge, and where the degree of belief in the truth of each event may be expressed by a number between 0 and 1, i. e. the person's probabilities. But how do we get to the understanding that the admissible numbers for probabilities lie in the range between 0 and 1, and how do we get to consider these numbers as our expression of uncertainty? There are various ways to arrive at this result, but we shall mention here only one way, mainly because it uses only minimal assumptions and technicalities. This should minimize the potential for objections and make the presentation accessible for a general audience. The argument is due to Lindley 90 and relies on our ability to compare uncertain events, as mentioned above. But rather than just comparing any two events, and assert which of the two compared events is endowed with more or less uncertainty than the other, Lindley introduces the idea of a comparison with a standard. That is, in order to measure our uncertainty regarding a given event (the measurand) numerically, a comparison is to be made against a standard. The standard is set up carefully such that its properties should be agreed by every reasonable person. 91 The conceptual standard introduced by Lindley is a container with a proportion p of black balls, and the 'standard' event is the observation of a black ball after a single draw. 92 Clearly, if all the balls in the container are black (and hence the proportion p is 1), we will be sure to observe a black ball: there will be no uncertainty about this observation. Similarly, if the proportion p of black balls is zero, we will be certain not to observe a black ball after a single draw. It is now obvious that our uncertainty regarding the ball being drawn to be black is closely related to the proportion p of black balls in the container, which can be adjusted to any number between 0 and 1. Note also that the standard can be defined in a more or less finely graded way, depending on the total number of balls: a container with 100 balls allows uncertainty to be expressed in 1 % increments, whereas an urn with 1000 balls allows uncertainty to be expressed in increments of 0.01 %, and so on.
We can now use this standard for measuring our uncertainty about any event of interest by asking ourselves how our uncertainty about the uncertain event, the measurand, compares to the uncertainty of drawing a black ball from the container -our standard. 93 Clearly, the answer depends on the proportion p of black balls. In particular, there must be a proportion p such that our uncertainty about the target event to be measured is the same as our uncertainty regarding the drawing of a black ball from the container. Once determined, this point of equivalence, as given by the proportion p, is then said to be our probability for the uncertain event. 94 To be clear, the suggestion here is not that we carry an urn with us to conduct a probability elicitation whenever we need one. 95, 96 The comparison is only to be contemplated. The sole purpose is to provide a way to explain, in principle, the nature and the form of probability assessments, using only most basic ingredients -free of any difficulties arising from mainstream (relative) frequency ideas. We do not deny that -despite its simplicity -the procedure of comparison with a standard may be difficult to apply, even conceptually. Indeed, critical observers might say that there is nothing in the procedure to prevent aleatory and fanciful assertions of equivalence points and, worse, that there is no guidance to help one find out when exactly one has reached a point of equivalence, however well-intentioned and committed one may be in the application of the procedure.
These objections have to do with unconstrained subjectivism, a problem that we addressed in § 2.3. Probability being a liberal concept, it requires scrutiny and challenge in its application. We will provide further means to address this issue in the next section. The objection regarding the difficulty of measuring uncertainty probabilistically is a valid one, though it is important to be precise about where exactly the difficulty lies. As argued in § 2.6, the difficulty is not due to the measurement procedure, which is an extremely simple one, but to the complexity of the measurand, that is the real-world event under consideration.
A further objection that may be raised concerns the relationship with evidence. As the attentive reader may have observed, the above definition of probability does not explicitly mention evidence and data. It is tempting, thus, to interpret this as yet another argument in support of the view that personal probabilities lack proper evidentiary bases. However, this reproach is misplaced because, as we have clarified at the outset, we are making a distinction between the definition of probability and its evaluation. The above definition -in terms of the conceptual application of a standard -only serves to express the idea of measuring uncertainty through probability. It is assumed that personal probability assignments thus made will take into account any relevant data there may be. This, however, is a question of how to evaluate probabilities in particular instances, and there are formal procedures available for this task. 97 It is legitimate to ask whether these are satisfactory answers that make subjective probability any better and more viable than classic (e. g. frequentist) accounts. Specifically, a key concern that remains -relevant for any conceptualization of probability -is the question of how 'good' a given probability assignment is, and how one can give incentives so that probability assessors give undistorted, non-exaggerated and non-aleatory probability assignments. The decisionalist perspective to probability, presented in the next section, precisely addresses this point.
Understanding probability assertions as decisions
Inherent in the understanding of probability as a person's expression of their degree of belief that a certain proposition is true, is the avoidance of deference to abstract notions (e. g. relative frequencies and base rates) that attempt to attribute to probabilities any sort of existence independent of the person who evaluates them. As we have seen, many scholars in law and other fields interested in probability have repeatedly exposed problems arising from said notions. While, technically, we agree with the impasses they expose, we disagree with their conclusion that probability, especially personal probability, is an inadequate concept; such a conclusion is tantamount to throw up one's hands at the price of making assessments at all. As we see them, the criticisms arise from unfruitful attempts of using single notions for both, the definition of probabilities in general, and their evaluation in actual instances of application. The interpretation of probability as measures of degrees of belief, as exposed in the previous section, effectively avoids such complications. 98 The question we address now is, given the understanding of probability being defined as a person's degree of belief, how can we conceive of a way to encourage individuals to make probability assignments in a serious and well reflected way.
One possibility consists in appealing to a person's responsibility for their probability assignments by insisting on the view that the assertion of a probability actually amounts to making a decision -a decision that ought to be 'well done', in some sense. To clarify this idea, the probabilist Bruno de Finetti emphasized the idea of scoring: the person who indicates her probabilities shall do so by keeping in mind that she will incur a penalty (or, score) based on the number (i. e. probability) that she has reported. The scoring method -in literature known as a scoring rule -is designed in such a way that it is in the person's interest to state the probability that corresponds to her actual degree of belief. Stated otherwise, under this kind of scoring rule, 99 the person can, by following the precept of providing sincere probability assertions, minimize the expectation of the penalty. In a nutshell, the score -we choose here the quadratic score as an example 100 -works as follows: for an event E, which may be either true or false, represented by the numbers 1 and 0, respectively, the asserted probability α for event E receives the score (1-α) 2 if the event E turns out to be true, and α 2 if the event E turns out to be false. The score thus amounts to the squared difference 101 between the asserted value α and the truth-values 1 and 0.
It might be objected at this point that the design of the scoring rule is of limited use for applications in the law because ground truths are typically unavailable in this context. However, as will be explained later in this section, actual ground truths are not needed, only (personal) probabilities for states of nature. These will be used to compute so-called probability-weighted scores, which in turn represent the core of the scoring rule argument.
Before approaching these details, start by considering the following more general properties of this scoring regime and their implications for probability utterances:
-Broadly speaking, we would say that one's thought, expressed in terms of probability, is 'good' if it lies in the direction of truth. 102 As may be seen, the quadratic score leads to smaller penalties the closer one's asserted probability is to 1 and 0 for events that are, respectively, true and false. 103 -The quadratic score discourages extreme probability assertions that go beyond the available evidence. Generally, having incomplete knowledge about the truth or falsity of an event of interest means that one's probability ought to be different from 1 and 0, respectively. If, nevertheless, one decides to make extreme probability assertions, the quadratic score will lead to maximum penalties if the event of interest does not turn out in the direction that one thought: for example, if one asserts probability α = 1, but the event of interest is false, then the maximum penalty of 1 (i. e. α 2 ) is obtained. If one would have been more cautious, say assert α = 0.8 instead of α = 1, then the penalty would be only 0.8 2 = 0.64 if the event turns out to be false.
Analogously, the penalty would also be 1 if one asserts α = 0 when in fact the event of interest is true. Here, too, a more cautious assessment, such as α = 0.2, would lead to a smaller score, i. e. (1-0.2) 2 = 0.64.
-A recurrent critique of subjective probability is that it tolerates 'random' probability assertions, so-called guesses, regardless of consideration given to where the actual truth lies. Under the quadratic scoring rule, however, such a decision behaviour (i. e. random guessing) is not recommended, for the following reason. Suppose that one randomly states either probability α = 1 or α = 0, leading to the maximal penalty of 1 if one's assertion does not correspond to the truth-value of event E. Then, in a series of n distinct probability assertions (i. e. for distinct events), if one gets it 'right' (i. e. assert α = 1 if E is true, and α = 0 if E is false) half of the time, the score incurred will be n/2. Now, compare this result with the score incurred by a person who is more prudent and prefers not to take sides in one way or another, and hence assert probability α = 0.5 in each case. This means that for each probability assertion, whether the event of interest turns out to be true or false, the score incurred will be 0.5 2 = 0.25. In a series of n probability assertions, the overall score will thus be n/4, which is smaller than that of the 'random guessing' strategy. Hence, subjective probability assertions are not 'anything goes' exercises, but can be improved with careful reflection.
We have not seen, so far, how the above ideas favour sincere probability assertions. As an illustration, consider the example of tossing an unbiased coin. To be clear, coin tossing is clearly not of interest in legal proceedings. It is used here solely to ensure that there is no ambiguity about the uncertain event to be assessed (i. e. whether the outcome of the single toss is head or tails), so that attention can be directed to the nature of probability and its conceptualisation through scoring rules. More realistic illustrations will be mentioned later. We discuss two aspects in turn: first, the meaning of an asserted probability resulting from the measurement against a standard (following arguments presented in § 3.2 and second, consideration of the asserted probability under the quadratic scoring rule.
Regarding the first aspect, it is widely accepted that the probability for the outcome heads (or tails) after tossing an unbiased coin is 0.5, 104 because the way in which the tossing experiment is conducted gives us no reason to consider that one outcome will be favoured over the other. It is worth noting that this informationknowledge about the tossing mechanism at work and, possibly, knowledge about the outcomes of past tosses -is evidence, actually. It is one source of information for justifying a probability assertion of 0.5. Specifically, asserting that our uncertainty about the outcome of a toss turning out heads (or tails) is measured by a probability of 0.5 means that we hold the same uncertainty for the event of drawing a black ball from an urn that contains the proportion p = 0.5 of black balls.
Having seen that our degree of belief about the outcome of the single coin toss is 0.5, we now turn to the second aspect, i. e. how to provide an incentive so that the asserted probability in fact corresponds to the actual probability of 0.5 we have in our mind. It is here that the scoring rule scheme intervenes. The question thus is, looking at the full range of possible probability assertions (i. e. the values between 0 and 1), how can we motivate the person to state 0.5, rather than a value other than the one she bears in mind (i. e. 0.5)? The point is that under a proper scoring rule, the decision to state 0.5 is optimal in the sense that it is the decision which minimises the expected score. The expected score is computed in two steps. First, if the coin falls on heads (i. e. the event E is true), our statement of probability 0.5 will lead to the loss (1 -0.5) 2 = 0.25. The probability of incurring this loss is 0.5, i. e. our probability for the event E. 105 Therefore, we have 0.5 × 0.25 = 0.125 as the first part of the computation of the expected score. Second, if the coin falls on tails (i. e. event E is false), our statement of 0.5 will also lead to a loss of 0.5 2 = 0.25. Again, this loss will be incurred with probability 0.5, the probability of event E being false. Thus, we have a second term 0.5 × 0.25 = 0.125 which contributes to the expected score. These two components combine by addition to give the expected score of stating 0.5, written ES(0.5):
The general formula for the expected score (ES) for an asserted probability α is
where Pr(E) is our personal (genuine) probability (i. e. degree of belief) for the event E, as defined above, depending on our knowledge, understanding and any relevant evidence available at the time our assessment is made. Note that the use of one's probabilities for the events E and not-E shows that actual ground truths are not necessary. 106 The core of the argument is the use of the probabilities for the events E and not-E to compute the expected score which serves as a measure to compare different belief statements α. In particular, note that the optimal probability α to be reported, i. e. the value α that minimises the expected score eq. (2), is the one that corresponds to Pr(E).
Let us provide some further illustration of this fundamental property of the quadratic scoring rule by showing that asserted values α different from Pr(E) = 0.5 lead to higher expected scores, and hence are not optimal decisions. Consider the assertions of, for example, α = 0.3 and α = 0.8. Using eq. (2), the expected scores for these two probability assertions are, respectively: To provide a complete picture, we can plot the expected score for all possible probability assertions α, as shown in Figure 1 .
Figure 1: Representation of the expected score (ES) as a function of the asserted probability α when the probability for the event of interest, E, is Pr(E) = 0.5. The optimal decision is to report the probability α that corresponds to one's probability Pr(E). All decisions to assert probabilities α different from 0.5 have higher expected scores. Examples (using dashed lines) are given for decisions to report α = 0.3 and α = 0.8, leading to expected scores of 0.29 and 0.34, respectively.
Note further that the principle that it is optimal to assert the probability α that corresponds to one's probability Pr(E) is valid for any probability, not just for the case of Pr(E) = 0.5 considered in the example above. We can illustrate this graphically as shown in Figure 2 . The x-axis in this figure represents the range of different degrees of belief, Pr(E), that one may have, in the range from 0 to 1. For each of these degrees of belief, there is exactly one asserted probability α that is optimal, i. e. α = Pr(E). Consider, for example, the decision to report probability α = 1. The straight line from the left top corner to the bottom right corner shows the expected score for this decision as a function of one's actual belief state, Pr(E). Clearly, if one's belief is Pr(E) = 0, the decision to report α = 1 has the highest expected score and, thus, will be the worst decision to make. All decisions to report values α < 1 have a smaller expected score. The decision to report α = 1 is the best decision only if Pr(E) = 1. In the latter case, the expected score is 0, and there is no other decision (i. e. report of a value α < 1) that has a smaller expected score. More generally, we can plot the expected scores for any decision α -in Figure 2 examples are given for vales α = {0,0.2,0.4,0.5,0.6,0.8,1} -to show that a reported probability α is optimal (i. e. has the minimal expected score) exactly when α = Pr(E), thus showing that under the chosen scoring rule reporting sincerely one's probability is always optimal. 107 , showing that reporting a value α is optimal -i. e. minimises the expected score -when the reported value α corresponds to one's actual degree of belief Pr(E).
Discussion of the decisionalist perspective to probability
At the outset, let us insist on the point that in the legal context, the scoring rule scheme is not a way to audit a probability assessor (e. g. an expert who reports a probability) in actual cases. Instead, it is an analytical argument that serves as a way to understand why genuine probability reporting is optimal. More generally, the scoring scheme illustrates the feasibility of conceiving incentives 108 to encourage people to assert personal probabilities honestly. Under the presented scheme, its neither advisable to distort numbers, in one direction or another, from one's actual degree of belief, nor is it advisable to declare probabilities in a random way (i. e. by careless guessing). These insights should help tame critiques 109 that label subjective probabilities as aleatory concepts that are not tailored in any way to available evidence. Indeed, without a device such as a proper scoring rule, there is nothing in the rules of probability that -strictly speaking -would forbid us to assert any probability, in the sense of a 'random guess'. Insofar, concerns about the 'seriousness' of personal probability assertions are legitimate and deserve careful consideration. But despite the thorough properties of scoring rules, critics may argue that the idea of scoring is of little practical value because one does not 'know', in the first place, what one's probability is (i. e. what probability one has in mind). In particular, so the objection, there is nothing to be contemplated about in terms of an 'optimal' probability α, to serve as a reported value, since there is no underlying degree of belief Pr(E) available against which α could be evaluated. This is a subtle observation for which different replies can be offered. First, it is important to note that the difficulty raised does not relate to the discussed scoring scheme, but refers to the difficulty of probability assignment in the first place. As we have noted repeatedly throughout this paper, this is a general difficulty that is not specific to subjective probability, but to any interpretation of probabilityfor as if there is any data and knowledge available, the subjectivist perspective will, as any other interpretation of probability, strive to use these data sources as suitably as possible. Second, the issue is not one of 'knowing' or not (one's) probability; in the subjectivist's perspective one knows, as per definition, one's probability, for it would not make sense to say that one does not know one's state of mind. 110 The question is if one is prepared to undertake the burden of pinning one's probability down, 111 at least in terms of an order of magnitude, and provide a justification for it; else the matter might better not be debated at all, at the price of offering no assessment at all.
But still, critics may say that given the number of occasions and the variety of cases where it is difficult to make up one's mind, the practical relevance of the scoring rule scheme is limited. This objection is formulated from a strongly applied perspective, and is similar to objections levelled against the measurement of probability using a standard. Clearly, as much as we do not suggest to carry out the measurement of uncertainty against a real, physical urn, we do not suggest that probability assessors compute expected scores. What is important, however, is the use of these ideas as conceptual devices. As regards the scoring scheme, it serves the purpose of clarifying that, ultimately, the task of asserting a probability comes down to a decision: the person must decide which value is the most defensible figure, given the best knowledge available to that person at the time when the probability assertion is made. This is not to say that the person shall not invoke symmetry considerations 112 or summaries of relevant data (such as relative frequencies 113 ) to inform her probability assignment. 114 The point of the scoring scheme is to avoid that people defer to abstract and seemingly impersonal definitions of probability and, by doing so, think that they hold no responsibility for their probability assertions, especially in cases where their assessments would be found problematic or otherwise dubious.
Historically, the quadratic scoring rule is known in meteorology as the Brier score 115 and has been widely studied since around the 1970s, but it is also very relevant for experts consulted in legal proceedings. Forensic science experts, for example, are regularly called on to inform a fact-finder about the probability of observing particular features in recovered material or marks (e. g. the DNA profile of a crime stain, or a configuration of ridge skin characteristics in a fingermark) under the assumption that the material or mark comes from an unknown person, different from the person of interest charged by the prosecution. For single donor DNA profiles that are (nearly) complete, and good quality fingermarks, such probabilities can be extremely low, to the point that some experts are tempted to report that it is impossible (i. e. probability of zero) to observe the evidential features in a person other than the person of interest -thus suggesting (overwhelmingly) strong support for the prosecution's proposition. However, asserting that the probability of seeing the evidential features in the event that an unknown person is the source is zero is both empirically unfounded and rationally unsound; it is a statement that goes beyond the available evidence. 116 Empirically, the statement is unfounded because the experts do not usually demonstrate that all other potential sources are in fact excluded, except in some atypical closed-set situations. And even if they presented evidence of comparisons with persons other than the person of interest, the factual accuracy of each individual comparison would hinge on probabilities of error not equal to zero (as human comparative examinations are known not to be error-free). 117 Hence, an expert's personal probability cannot be zero, and rounding it off to zero would, under a proper scoring rule, not be an optimal value to report. The scoring rule scheme thus is one way of showing experts why they should not distort probabilities away from their actual degree of belief. 118 Note that the probability assignment task here is a general one, encountered also with other types of evidence.
A further area of expert evidence where scientists should avoid the reporting of categorical opinions (i. e. certainty statements) involves DNA mixtures, i. e. traces that contain genetic material from more than one person. Based on the number of characteristics seen in the DNA mixture profile, some scientists seek to infer the number of persons who have contributed material to the mixed stain. Invoking ad-hoc criteria, such as the maximum allele count method, they make assertions about the minimum number of persons necessary to produce the set of characteristics seen in the trace. However, as real-life cases have shown, categorical statements about the number of contributors can lead to paradoxical results, 119 such as a particular person of interest being considered excluded or non-excluded as a potential contributor to a mixed stain, depending on the assumed number of contributors. One of the sources of such complications is the categorical assertion of a number (of contributors) that, in reality, is not and cannot be known with certainty. A scientifically more honest report should acknowledge uncertainty and express it in terms of probability. In this context, a scoring rule helps to show that -conceptually -it is preferable to assign probabilities to different possible numbers of contributors, rather than assigning a probability of 1 to only one particular number of contributors (and zero to all other possible contributors). Further, probabilistic reporting not only avoids paradoxical results of the kind mentioned above, it can also empirically be shown -in terms of incurred scores over multiple assessments -to be superior to certainty statements (i. e. a categorical reporting format). 120 Of course, the crucial question that remains is whether scientists are able to provide justified probability assignments for the situation at hand supported, ideally, by relevant data. 121 We entirely agree with this call for challenging assigned probabilities, as outlined in § 2.3, but this aspect is not covered by scoring rules 122 these only seek to encourage the honest reporting of probabilities within the scope of what is argumentatively defensible. Again, either one is prepared to address the burden of justification, and assume responsibility for any assigned value, or else no opinion should be offered.
Objectivism versus objectivity in subjectivism: "Nothing is lost what was a mere illusion"

123
Our argument throughout this paper has been that there is no way for any person asserting a probability to avoid taking a personal stance. All attempts to conceive of some sort of 'objective' probability, independent of the person uttering a probability, are bound to fail because, by necessity, adopting a criterion or definition requires itself, at some point, a personal choice 124 -or an interpersonal agreement. 125 For virulent critics of subjective probability, in both science and the law, this position might be offensive and inacceptable, for they regard objectivity as the ultimate virtue to which all human activity ought to aspire. 126 Underlying these concerns is a rather stereotypical distinction between what is objective and what is not, and hence is, necessarily, unacceptably subjective -in the sense that a subjective statement could not, by definition, have any objective status. 127 But the matter is more subtle than that. A brief comment thus is in order.
The opposition between subjectivism and objectivism is not a recent observation. 128 It was also at the centre of attention for the founders of subjective probability, such as de Finetti. Interestingly, the subjectivist de Finetti was not dismissive of objective notions, but insisted on carefully defining their scope. For example, he admitted that "(…) statements have objective meaning if one can say, on the basis of a well-determined observation (which is at least conceptually possible), whether they are either TRUE or FALSE". 129 More generally, objectivity in probability assessment clearly was a concern for de Finetti, as he was mindful of how to meaningfully and justifiably assign probabilities, in the light of available evidence and knowledge. His decisional approach to probability assertion, using the method of scoring rules was his main instrument to approach this challenge. 130 It is important to note that in this scoring rule scheme, the notion of 'goodness' of probability assertions does not relate to a supposed objective probability. Instead, 'goodness' is assessed by comparison to the truth-values of the uncertain events and, as mentioned above, de Finetti did not question that those truth values are objective. 131 However, he opposed the idea of objectivism 132 by which he referred to claims that ascribe to probability a meaning that is independent of the thinking individual -i. e. the existence of probability as a property of the outside world.
In summary, thus, the genuine personal probabilities -in the de Finettian subjective sense -do and must, as suitably as possible, acknowledge and incorporate objective elements. This brings us back to de Finetti's insistence on distinguishing between the definition of probability and the assignment of a probability in an individual case. Regarding this distinction, Carla Maria Galavotti, in her foreword to De Finetti's philosophical lectures on probability, explains:
Unlike subjectivists, that do not confuse the definition and the evaluation of probability, upholders of the other interpretations do; they embrace a unique criterion -be it frequency or symmetry -and use it as grounds for both the definition and the evaluation of probability. They take a 'rigid' attitude towards probability, which implies a univocal choice of the probability function. On the contrary, the subjectivist approach is 'elastic', it does not commit the choice of one particular function to a single rule or method, but regards all coherent functions admissible. 133 This versatile aspect of probability should look attractive for legal scholars who emphasize a pluralistic perspective to belief formation. 134 They should also find value in the fact that, as Galavotti further explains, (de Finettian) subjectivism is an appeal to the careful appraisal of the multitude of sources of relevant information that one encounters, a view quite contrary to the misinterpretation of subjective probability as 'anything goes' opinions:
For de Finetti, the evaluation of probability is the result of a complex procedure involving both subjective and objective elements. Indeed, for him the explicit recognition of the role played by subjective elements within the formation of probability judgments is a prerequisite for the appraisal of objective elements. He always warned that the objective component of probability judgments, namely factual evidence, is in many respects context-dependent: evidence must be collected carefully and skilfully [sic], its exploitation depending on the judgment on what elements are relevant to the problem under consideration and enter into the evaluation of probabilities. Furthermore, the collection and exploitation of evidence depend on economic considerations that vary according to the context. For all of these reasons, the exploitation of factual evidence involves subjective elements of various kinds. 135 Ultimately, for de Finetti, this comprehensive perspective provides a decisive advantage for the subjectivist over the objectivist views, not least because -by their attempt to define single and unique criteria -objectivist approaches must necessarily ignore some aspects to the detriment of the value that these aspects could add, thus depriving evaluators from relevant information. 136 The genuinely subjective account, instead, is always free to exploit the entirety of the thinking mind's cognitive means and sources of information. 137 In one of his many forceful commentaries, de Finetti has expressed this view as follows:
Not being able to invent methods of synthesis comparable in power and insight to those of the human intuition, nor to construct miraculous robots capable of such, he [the objectivist] contents himself, willingly, with simplistic schematizations of very simple cases based on neglecting all knowledge except a unique element which lends itself to utilization in the crudest way. 138 Again, this appeal to a person's entirety of knowledge is compatible with how legal scholars view reasoning processes at trial, that is organic and operated by humans. 139 As a last and contemporary illustration of the inevitability of personal probabilities in the de Finettian sense, consider probabilities used in the context of forensic DNA evidence. In this field, figures are often referred to as objective (or, 'statistical') probabilities by both scientists and non-scientists alike because -unlike in other forensic fields where relevant datasets are sparse -abundant genetic data are now widely available in specialist literature. However, as emphasized by Evett et al., there is nothing inherently objective in DNA profile probabilities assigned on the basis of such data:
There appears to be a fairly widespread misconception that there is a real "statistical probability" to be assigned to a [DNA] profile but this is not the case. There is an infinite range of ways of carrying out the calculation that underlies the figure given. The method chosen in the individual case must be seen to be as much a matter of opinion as one given in other areas of forensic science. The match probability is "personal". It is based on what the scientist considers to be the most appropriate calculation given the circumstances of the case. 140 
Corollaries for probability assertions and their scrutiny
Though not unimportant, the debates over subjectivism and objectivism represent a marginal topic with little prospect of new arguments, mainly because the two notions are intertwined (with the latter being part of the former). More important are aspects such as honesty on the part of the person conducting an assessment, completeness of evidence and the elicitation of statements reflecting faithful representations. These aspects are particularly relevant in the context of expert witnesses testifying as to probability assignments. The decisionalist perspective to personal probability exposed throughout this paper lends itself to several remarks thereto.
Truthfulness, for example, is widely considered as the ultimate virtue, but empirical means to pursue it are rather limited. Oath, for example, is at best an encouragement or an appeal to honesty, but no guarantee. 141 The scoring rule scheme, too, might seem inapplicable at first sight because the recipient of a probabilistic assertion, prima facie, has no direct means to 'know' whether the asserted probability coincides with the person's actual degree of belief. All that the external observer can hope for is that the person will act in her interest by honestly stating her probability -reporting this value is the optimal decision, as we have seen, because it is the one with the minimum expected score. What is more, since the ground truth is not known in a criminal trial -for otherwise there would be no litigated matter and no need to consult an expert or witness -there is no way to know how far from the truth a given probability assertion is. 142 This does not mean, however, that a dishonest person has nothing to fear. Because her assertions expose her directly to her peers, she should care about the reasonableness of her opinions, and their faithful statement. Conceptually, such sincere reporting of scientific opinions is precisely the aim of considering probability assertions as decisions under a scoring rule scheme. Thus, an expert who intends to proceed responsibly and who wishes to avoid appearing unreasonable, should abstain from reporting an aleatory opinion. 143 She should think carefully about what a competent expert's opinion ought to be in the case at hand. This is an idealistic view of expert testimony that could face challenges such as partisan bias, 144 and that is not immune to possible expert disagreements. 145 Thus, in practice, procedural elements such as cross-examination and rebuttal require additional means for peer-reviewing and rationalizing the reporting of probabilities.
Following discussion presented earlier in § 2.3, probability assertions ought to be accompanied by a justification, or an argument, because the recipient of expert information shall be able to understand how a particular opinion came to be, and on what evidence it is based. But there is a further dimension to this requirement. The recipient of expert information should also expect assistance in placing the expert's statement within a wider context, by which we mean an explanation by the expert of how her opinion compares to that of other qualified witnesses in her field of expertise. This is a subtle means to probe the comprehensiveness of the expert's knowledge and expertise in her field of specialty, or at least represents an incentive for her to self-critically assess the frontiers thereof. This is particularly crucial when the expert considers that her opinion is not in line with the view of peers in her field; it is important then to elicit the extent to which her opinion differs from mainstream views, and why (e. g. the expert may have more specialist knowledge and expertise than the average of experts in her field, maintain a different interpretation of available data or the state of the art, etc.).
Inquiring about the foundations of expert opinions is important because, as we have explained, the liberal concept of probability as such does not prescribe any particular probability values, nor is there any 'true' probability. 146 Thus, experts should consider it to be their duty to provide accompanying explanations, so as to help recipients of expert information absorb complex matters of scientific expertise, and judge their reasonableness. 147, 148 Where such information is not provided by experts, opinions should be challenged so as to elicit the required information.
Decision structures in juridical evidence and proof
Conceptual insufficiency of purely probabilistic standards of decision
In scholarly discussions of evidence and proof standards, references to probability abound, used either as a qualitative verbal notion to express a person's degree of uncertainty, or quantitatively as a minimum threshold required to reach a particular conclusion. Although there appears to be some consensus, at least in standard textbooks, on how expressions such as "preponderance of the evidence" (or "balance of probabilities") in civil cases and "beyond reasonable doubt" in criminal cases might be expressed in quantitative probabilistic terms, ample empirical research shows that there is diversity in how different individuals, from different backgrounds (e. g. prospective jurors, judges, citizens), actually associate numbers and words. 149, 150 The difficulty appears to stem from two intertwined aspects: the first is the question of what is the exact probability threshold that ought to be reached in a given case, and the second aspect relates to the issue of 'knowing' when exactly one has reached a particular probability. Throughout this paper, we have focused on the latter aspect, arguing that while -conceptually -one's probability can be defined clearly, the nature of probabilities, their elicitation and assertion in practice can be further clarified and scrutinized through a decisional perspective. We shall now argue that this decisional perspective is also relevant for the former aspect, i. e. standards of decision. Specifically, we shall argue that traditional discourses about abstract probability thresholds are short-sighted in the sense that they misconceive the scope of the application of probability.
To illustrate our view, let us take a closer look at the attempts to define or assert a specific probability (threshold) for a particular decision (i. e. conclusion or verdict). By definition, as we have argued, an asserted probability only expresses the degree of belief that a given person entertains about the truth or otherwise of a particular uncertain event (or, proposition), based on all the knowledge, data and evidence available to that person at the time she asserts her probability. Of course, there is nothing in the theory of probability that either prevents or encourages the definition of an 'if-then rule' of decision of the kind 'if the probability of a particular proposition (e. g. Mr A is the person who assaulted Mr B) is greater than x, then decide so and so'. Legal literature abounds with arguments for the view that such rules may be unsuitable. Without going into the details of those objections, we agree that crude 'if (and only if)-then' rules are unsuitable to make decisions for the simple reason that, strictly speaking, probability -in isolation -is not designed to warrant particular decisions. It is important, however, to be precise about what to conclude from this observation, and it is here that our view diverges from the criticism commonly levelled at legal probabilism. The standard critique is that probability as a whole is unsuitable for decision-making in the law. In our view, however, it is a misconstruction to think that probability alone could logically warrant a particular decision; the criticism (of unsuitability) thus is essentially pointless because it blames the theory for something that it does not purport to do. The real problem, as we see it, is the failure of discussants to address the issue of standards of proof for what they are: questions of decision. Probability, as such, is only concerned with capturing and formally expressing uncertainty. It is a necessary but insufficient preliminary for making a decision. So rather than criticizing probability as such, attention should be drawn to the question of how to establish coherent uncertainty expressions -in terms of probability -as integral parts of formal procedures that lead to decisions. Supporters of the relative plausibility account of legal proof have worked on this aspect by discussing the role that probability may assume as one concept among others that is used in arriving at legal conclusions. 151 To some extent, it is surprising that discourse about abstract probability thresholds, and attempts to use them as unique decision criteria, 152 are even entertained, because it is generally agreed that legal decisions involve many dimensions for which decision makers may seek optimisation. 153 For example, it is widely argued that upon making a decision (e. g. rendering a verdict), one ought to think about the possible consequences of the decision and their relative merit or inconvenience, notions more commonly referred to as stakes. Such aspects are relevant in the law 154 as much as in other contexts of societal, professional or personal decision-making. This is not to say that probabilistic decision thresholds cannot be defined; actually, they can be defined and there is a formal framework for this that allows one to take into account decision consequences and their relative (un-) desirability. 155 While uncontroversial from a purely mathematical point of view, the application of this framework -especially the interpretation of the framework's elements with respect to particular aspects of legal cases -has caused considerable debate among practitioners and academics. 156 We will not reiterate this debate in full detail, nor will we take particular sides with one or the other of the pre-eminent positions. 157 Instead, we will focus on what we call decision structures, which are based on selected elements of the formal (decisiontheoretic) framework that we consider capable of providing a conceptual and structural account of inference and decision problems in the law and (forensic) science. We will do so by adopting a historical perspective based on works of, among others, Bruno de Finetti. His views on the meaningful use of decision theory appear to be rarely acknowledged in the legal literature. We will point out how they can help construct arguments that do not raise the latent criticisms of decision theory in the legal context, and place the seemingly concurrent notions of probability and (relative) plausibility into perspective.
The inevitable elements of decision structures and their interpretation 4.2.1 Elements of decision structures
More than half a century ago, researchers from various fields engaged in the development of a lively area of investigation into questions of decision-making where the consequences of decisions typically have monetary consequences and the aim is to elaborate optimal decisions with respect to well-defined criteria. 158 In the decades that followed, mathematicians and statisticians, economists, psychologists and philosophers of science, among others, pursued decision-science research from prescriptive, descriptive and normative perspectives. 159 The early contribution by legal scholars to formal decision-oriented research is illustrated by the work of Kaplan. 160 His work is remarkable and still a highly recommendable read today because of his capacity to express complex matters in accessible terms. Kaplan described the formal decision-analytic viewpoint as follows:
Put in its most abstract form, the typical decision-theory problem involves the proper course of action to be taken by a decisionmaker who may gain or lose by taking action upon uncertain data that inconclusively support or discredit differing hypotheses about the state of the real but nonetheless unknowable world. 161 As is clear from this statement, the problem is essentially one of decision making under uncertainty, i. e. choosing a course of action when one does not know which state of the world actually holds, though one may have some -most often incomplete -evidence about it. These elements are fundamental and inevitable in the sense that they are encountered by any decision maker and cannot be discussed away. 162 Matters become more intricate and controversial in discussions about the application of the theory, especially the quantification of uncertainties using (subjective) probabilities, the valuation of consequences (through utilities or losses) and the combination of these elements through computations of expected value; i. e. expected utility (or, loss). Expected value provides a measure that allows one to compare competing decisions and provide the basis for decision criteria, such as the maximisation (minimisation) of expected utility (loss). The mathematical structure of these notions is not controversial. However, debates arose over what exactly these notions can add to the understanding and practice of proof processes. The extensive exchanges between Professors Ronald J. Allen and David H. Kaye provide a detailed account of the intricate matters and perspectives involved. Professor Kaye, for example, places an emphasis on the capacity of the theory to serve as a logically rigorous analytical method. 163, 164 Though not denying this feature, Professor Allen focuses on the descriptive capacity of theories to provide satisfactory accounts of the actual working of the legal process and the individuals involved, especially what they are actually able to do, in terms of their mental (unaided) computational capacities. Regarding this aspect, he considers decision theory and expected value computations as unsuitable. 165 These disagreements concern the implications of particular results when applying decision theory in its full force. 166 And yet, the problem is almost universally considered -even among critical commentators of mathematical approaches 167 -as one of decision under uncertainty. No one denies that decisions must be taken, 168 that decisions have consequences of varying desirability (i. e. accurate and erroneous decision outcomes), and that we usually are uncertain about which consequence exactly will follow our action. The fundamental point is that we can identify these elements at various stages of action in the legal process and it is for this reason that we refer to those elements as forming fundamental decision structures, or the anatomy of decisions. Our main argument in this paper is that this decisional nature of particular aspects of legal proof is of wider significance as it can also serve to critically analyse the notions of probability and relative plausibility. We shall now provide a sketch of these decision structures to illustrate the commonalities of their underlying tenets.
General decision structures in verdicts and assertions of probability and relative plausibility
We start out by considering the most widely recognised decision structure, concerning ultimate issues. A trier of fact is presented with one side's (e. g. plaintiff or prosecution, P for short) allegation, and an opponent's (i. e. defendant's, D for short) contradiction of that allegation. An example for a civil case could be a claim in which the plaintiff seeks to prove that he suffered an injury as a result of a negligent act by the defendant. Decisions in favour of one side or the other may lead to accurate or erroneous outcomes (i. e. decision consequences), depending on whether or not P's or D's allegation is true. Accurate decision consequences -i. e. factually correct findings -are preferred to erroneous findings, and possibly there is also a preference ordering among the erroneous findings (e. g. a false conviction in a criminal case is usually considered worse than a false acquittal). The anatomy of this decision problem thus consists of verdicts (i. e. decisions or possible courses of action), states of nature (i. e. the parties' allegations or 'stories') and decision consequences.
Keeping the logic of this decision structure in mind, we can now see that there is no difference, in principle, with the idea of probability as a decision presented in § 3.2. 169 A person required to assert a probability α regarding an event E must decide on a particular value and do so in a state of incomplete knowledge about whether or not E is true. As shown in Figure 3 , read from left to right, the consequence of asserting probability α will result in a distance with respect to the truth-value of event E. This distance is zero if one asserts α equal to 1 (0) when E is true (false). The desirability of the various outcomes is expressed through a positive score (shown on the far right-hand side in Figure 3 ). This score is given by the square of the difference between the asserted probability α and the actual truth-value of the event E. The decomposition of probability assertion as shown in Figure 3 is known as a decision tree. Note that there is a further dimension to decision tree analysis known as 'folding back'. It consists in computing the expected score (ES) for each decision α, 170 obtained by weighing the score of each decision outcome by its probability of occurrence, and summing the products thus obtained. As outlined in § 3.2, the optimal decision α, i. e. the decision with the minimum ES, is the one that corresponds to one's probability of the event E. We shall not repeat the full development of this computational level at this point because it goes beyond the descriptive exposition of the fundamental decision structures. Decision structure for asserting a probability α for an event of interest, E, which may either be true or false. The difference between the asserted probability α and the truth-value of E, i. e. the decision outcome, is valued in terms of a score given by the squared difference between the asserted probability and the truth-values 1 and 0, respectively, of event E. Note that, formally, this representation is a partial decision tree because probabilities for states of nature and computations of expected scores are not included.
The structural analogy between the above examples is insightful because, prima facie, decisions concerning ultimate issues and the assignment of a probability for an uncertain event may appear to be quite different tasks. Notwithstanding, it is clear that -analytically -conclusions in favour of the plaintiff's (P) and defendant's (D) accounts can be represented in a tree-like form of the kind shown in Figure 3 , reduced to two decision branches. In turn, the real-world states would be the actual truth of either P's or D's account, leading to accurate and erroneous findings for P and D, respectively, depicted on the far right-hand side of the decision tree.
These analogies raise the question of how the decisional view of key operational tasks in legal processes relates to other perspectives, such Allen and Pardo's relative plausibility account of the structure of juridical proof. At its core, their account amounts to evaluating the parties' allegations through considerations such as coherence, completeness and consistency, and engaging in a deliberative process of assessing the congruence of the presented evidence with the competing versions of the contested events, using the fact-finder's entirety of knowledge, background information and cognitive capacity. 171 In terms of its structural elements, this account appears to involve the same elements as the general decision structure for ultimate issues sketched above: 172 a decision needs to be made for one of the competing stories, yet this decision is made in light of incomplete knowledge about the actual state of the world, thus leading to uncertainty about the correctness of the decision being made.
In broad terms, the relationship between relative plausibility and the decisional perspective may be perceived in at least two ways. One possibility is to consider relative plausibility as the argumentative background, justification and support for a fact-finder's selection of one of the available decisions (i. e. the finding for P or D, respectively). According to this view, the fundamental decision structure regarding ultimate issues is the one presented at the beginning of this section, with relative plausibility providing the explanation of the factfinder's decision. A second possibility is to consider relative plausibility judgments as decisions in their own right. This view appears quite compatible with how Allen and Pardo circumscribe relative plausibility theory. Specifically, they note:
The "relative plausibility" theory explains the process as involving reasoning put to the effort of deciding the relative plausibility of the parties' various explanations of the evidence and contested events.
[emphasis added] 173 Thus, understanding the identification, selection and assertion of the most plausible account as a decision under uncertainty can be graphically conveyed in terms of the decision tree shown in Figure 4 . Note again that we focus only on a qualitative representation of the three essential elements that the decision maker faces: an exhaustive list of decisions (among which one element must be chosen), states of nature (though it is unknown which state of nature is actually true) 174 and decision consequences (outcomes). The decision tree represents these elements in natural flow, from left to right, thus providing an anatomy of the decision problem. So far, our analysis has essentially been descriptive. 175 Besides, we have left the quantitative part of decision trees intentionally aside because -historically -it involves aspects over which legal scholars disagree. Instead, our aim was to delineate the inevitable structural aspects with which, hopefully, most discussants would agree. In this sense, the decision tree representation helps clarify where exactly current debates align and diverge. We work out these distinctions in some further detail below.
Reconsidering the interpretation of decision-theoretic advice
Proponents of the full decision-theoretic perspective would find the decision tree shown in Figure 4 incomplete because it does not provide an explicit criterion for selecting one particular course of action over an alternative. Developing the decision tree in its complete form would require the assignment of utilities (or losses) for decision outcomes (at the far right-hand side of the tree) and of probabilities for the possible states of nature. Proponents of decision theory would use these elements to compute the expected utility (or loss) for each decision (i. e. assertion of the most plausible account), and then decide based on consideration of the decision with the maximum (minimum) expected utility (loss). 176 However, the framing of legal decision criteria based on the notion of expected value is a contested topic. 177 It is worthwhile, thus, to devote some discussion to it. It is at this point that we introduce a critical reflection on decision-theoretic guidance from a historical perspective.
Classic decision theory identifies the best decision as the one which maximizes (minimizes) the fact-finder's expected utility (loss). Leaving aside technical aspects regarding the nature and feasibility of probability and utility assignment (which are necessary for computing expected values), the contested issue appears to be how to interpret decision-theoretic results in practical applications, such as the law. From one point of view, determining the decision(s) 178 with the maximum (minimum) expected utility (loss) is a mere technical operation with some computational burden. However, an additional step is involved until an actual decision is made in practice, and it is legitimate to ask to what extent decision makers are willing to base their decisions on the sole consideration of decision-theoretic advice. This, in turn, raises the broader question of how to understand normative 179 theories, of which decision theory is a prominent example. A widely held view is that, by its nature, a normative account is an imperative for what ought to be done, i. e. what one ought to decide. Presumably, it is this strict interpretation 180 of normative models in the law that provokes objections among legal scholars. The question of how to interpret normative theories is not specific to the law, however, as it has also been a concern for probability and decision theorists, at least since half a century ago, and it is instructive to attend to some of their views. A noteworthy example is the position of de Finetti, whose decisional account was presented in § 3.2. Although considered by some as a radical probabilist, 181 he favoured a well reflected and balanced view of decision theory. He explicitly recognized the interpretation of a normative theory as a "compendium of mandatory prescriptions" 182 as problematic because it would lead to a suppression of freedom of choice. Recognizing critiques of strict normativism, de Finetti considered it necessary to view normative advice as conditional:
(…) I consider the criticisms of aspects of a theory that contain something rigidly normative as justified, while the normative character in the conditional sense must be considered not only acceptable but necessary. 183 Thus, according to de Finetti, a decision-theoretic result should serve not as a prescription, but as a conditional advice, contributing to the entirety of considerations taken into account by the decision maker, prior to making a decision:
(…) it is not a question of prescribing anything, but only of giving each person a tool to enable them to better analyze and compare the pros and cons of each decision according to their own point of view, before choosing. 184 As we have argued elsewhere, 185 this perspective seems well compatible with the relative plausibility account, according to which participants in the legal process rely on a broad scope of cognitive devices and strategies in their reasoning and decision-making activities.
Numeracy and the quest for practicality
Critical readers might ask how a theory can produce advice of any kind if it is based on formulae that involve numerical components for which no guidance is offered regarding how to assign them. Bell, for example, has noted that the formula proposed by Kaplan 186 "does not rationalize any particular standard of proof unless values are assigned to the variables". 187 Apart from being a truism, this critique of a formula is in fact a critique of the concept of utility on which the formula is built. The assignment of utilities is a notoriously difficult topic, a difficulty we do not deny. Notwithstanding, it is important to be clear as to the exact purpose of the notion of utility: in essence, it is a number that expresses the value a person assigns to a particular decision consequence (i. e. outcome). 188 Thus, utility is operationalised only through its application by a person who uses it to express her preferences between decision consequences. Any mechanism of autonomous value assignment would make the concept vacuous, as it would deprive it from the very purpose it is designed for: helping persons to make a value assignment.
It is sometimes suggested that, as a consequence of the difficulty of assigning utilities, the concept should be abandoned altogether. One is free, of course, to disregard the concept of utility, but this would not make the problem disappear. One would still face the inevitable reality that decisions do have consequences and that we do have varying preferences between those consequences. Any formal approach to the problem would require one to provide a means to capture the value of decision consequences. Utility is one such means. Again, critics may question whether a single number (i. e. utility) can meaningfully capture something so complex as the value of decision consequences in legal applications. Admittedly, a single-valued utility may be considered as a simplistic measure, but how could we ever pretend to employ a more elaborate measure if we cannot even handle a simple measure? 189 Although it is worthwhile scrutinizing assignments of particular numerical values, it would be inappropriate to consider 'hard' numerical assignments as a necessary requirement to make decision-theoretic formulae useful. 190 To illustrate this point, consider the well-known result that, in the ordinary civil case, Kaplan's 191 formula leads to the threshold probability of >0.5 when an erroneous finding for either party is assigned the same disutility (e. g. a symmetric 0-k loss function). 192 This value, >0.5, is widely considered as the numerical expression of the 'preponderance of the evidence' standard for the typical civil case. 193 This is not the main point, however, since the formula shows more than this. Even without settling for particular numbers, increasing the loss value assigned for the adverse result of one decision, compared to the loss value assigned to the adverse consequence that can potentially result from the alternative decision, will lead to an increase of said threshold probability (above 0.5) -as commonly required in the context of criminal cases. Friedman has concisely summarised these qualitative relationships as follows:
Suppose that Option One has far worse consequences if wrong than does Option Two. Then a sensible decision-maker will choose Option One rather than Option Two only if she has a high degree of confidence that Option One rather than Option Two is correct, or, put another way, only if she thinks Option One is far more probable than Option Two. 194 More informally, the decision-theoretic criterion thus appears to capture the common intuition that 'the more is at stake, the more one shall be sure before one decides', that is the understanding that one's decision is, broadly speaking, a 'weighing' of relative strengths of belief (i. e. the extent to which one is convinced of the truth or otherwise of competing propositions) against relative losses. 195, 196 Clearly, this qualitative relationship can be considered at various levels of detail, as argued by Friedman: "The concept of magnitude is essential. (…) we need to have a sense of how much worse one error is than the other." 197 In combination, the above strains of argument emphasize the analytical nature of the decision-theoretic perspective and its role in providing a structured way of thinking about problems, in a conditionally advisory sense, as compared to accounts that focus primarily on providing a descriptive account of decision behaviour, or the functioning of a system. 198 Further, the non-prescriptive interpretation of the formal decision-theoretic perspective avoids the reduction of practical decisions to purely mathematical questions, as critics may invoke. Specifically, it does not intend to delegate decision competence or decision prerogatives to an abstract criterion or a theory. Instead, the purpose of conditional decision-theoretic advice is to question and scrutinise one's consistency relationships (i. e. coherence) among (probabilistic) beliefs and value assignments for decision consequences, in particular adverse outcomes, and make these considerations formally precise, so as to help justify particular lines of reasoning or conclusions.
Discussion and conclusions
Past and contemporary debates among legal scholars on the nature, substance and form of evidence evaluation and proof processes in the law show a stark tendency to develop comprehensive theories. The construction of such theories is ambitious, however, and the various participants to the discussion have found their counterparts' accounts deficient in various respects, highlighted often in intense discussions over detailed aspectsprovoking equally detailed replies and rebuttals. 199 As argued in a recent work by Professor Michael Pardo, 200 too often, there has been a focus on treating problems in isolation, thus making it difficult to see connections between and broader dimensions of the different concepts.
One area where this difficulty arises is the nature and role of probability in the legal process. It is often said, for example, that the rules of probability map poorly onto the way in which people actually think (when unaided from a cognitive standpoint). Although being an empirical truth, 201 this does not -as we have argued through this paper -impede on the core of probability theory for the latter does not claim to provide a descriptive account. Similarly, no one would find arithmetic operations of addition and subtraction unsuitable simply because some people find them difficult to operate or understand. 202 Thus, critiques should be tailored to what the respective accounts actually purport to do, and proponents of particular accounts -especially probabilists -should be careful not to overinterpret the scope of applicability of their accounts. 203 Better delineating the potential and scope of formal methods of reasoning and decision analysis should help us (i) further the understanding and clarify key aspects of legal proof and decision processes, (ii) prevent unjustified criticisms and (iii) shed more light on ways in which distinct concepts can beneficially interact so as to offer solutions that go beyond what individual accounts may be able to provide in isolation.
This article started from the premise that if particular formal concepts, especially probability and decision theory, have a place within the broad scope of cognitive devices used in applied contexts such as the law, it remains important to address the recurrent criticism to which these concepts are exposed. Despite the fact that this might be perceived as treating individualised and local problems, resolving these issues remains an important preliminary to deploying the full potential of the various concepts.
This article makes three contributions in this regard. The first is a critical review and discussion of recurrent critiques of probability. The second is the presentation of a historically important and logically well founded, but in the law largely unknown, account of probability. It is based on the idea of encouraging individuals to take responsibility for their quantifications of uncertainty, by viewing probability assertion as a decision, rather than a deference to abstract definitions that conflate the definition of probability with its assessment in actual cases, which encounters operational difficulties. The third contribution emphasizes the conceptual relationship between this decisional perspective of probability and other notions and decision points in the legal process. Here our argument focuses on what we call decision structures that represent the minimal anatomy of decision problems as they appear to all discussants, irrespective of the position from which they argue. In analysing these decision structures, we invoke elements of classic decision theory, but emphasise the need to interpret them carefully. Here, too, we adopt a historical perspective and rely on foundational literature to argue against overinterpreting results of normative analyses in a rigidly prescriptive sense. We identify such overinterpretation as a further source of controversies over the role of probability and decision theory in the law.
Regarding our first topic of inquiry, probability interpretations in the law, we found it inevitable to review the divide between objectivist and subjectivist viewpoints, both of which face distinct critiques. While we agree with the shortcomings and limitations of objectivist accounts of probability, which demonstrate their illusionary goals and self-defeating character, we insist on considering these complications not as a drawback of probability as such, but only as a deficiency of a particular interpretation of probability. This leaves the subjectivist interpretation of probability as a remaining option, 204 though it is not free of attracting its own critiques. Among the most widely known critique is the sentiment that 'subjective' means allowance of arbitrary and unconstrained assertions, in the sense of 'anything goes', in ignorance of any available evidence. Where probability assertions indeed exhibit these shortages, legal scholars and practitioners are right to expose and denounce them. 205 In such instances, however, their critiques do not address an inadequacy of subjective probability, but a misapprehension of what it really means to understand and apply probability in terms of subjective degrees of belief. We have illustrated this through an analysis and discussion of relevant historical sources that depict an image of subjective probability, based on the notion of justified assertion, that is quite different from how it is exposed in standard critiques. While we concede that, in general, probability is a very liberal concept with rather few constraints, apart from requirements of consistency, it is desirable to conceive of a way to encourage honest and well-reflected probability assertions.
This has led us to our second and main topic of inquiry: the understanding of probability assertion as a decision. The decisionalization of probability, as we call it, highlights the idea that asserting probabilities should be assessed carefully, making the best use of all relevant available data, knowledge and information -in a way that can be disclosed and audited. The underlying formal development, based on (proper) scoring rules, is rather well-known in the history of subjective probability, but rarely invoked in legal literature and science other than some areas involving the elicitation of expert opinions and the evaluation of forecasters. The reasons for this are, supposedly, its uncompromising rigour and intricacy. Clearly, thus, our suggestion here is not to introduce probability elicitation based on scoring rules in practical proceedings. We have invoked scoring rules solely for the purpose of showing that there is a way to formalise the intuition of considering probability assertion as a decision, with the interesting result that one should not -under a proper scoring rule -decide to report a distorted probability that does not correspond to one's actual belief (e. g. rounding off a small probability to zero). Notwithstanding, scientific (e. g. forensic) experts may be expected to know about and understand the related theory. 206 The practical avenues for this perspective remain vague, however, since there is no structured approach to probability in science; there remains a strong tradition of educating scientists in mainstream accounts 207 of probability, without informing them enough about the conceptual limitations of these approaches, let alone exposing them to critical methodological enquiry about foundational concepts -areas often considered too far from practical consideration and, at best, to be left to the scrutiny of philosophers of science or statisticians with special interests. 208 A further reason why we have introduced the decisional perspective to probability is that it is merely a particular instance of the application of classic decision theory that reveals structural analogies with respect to other stages of juridical evidential assessment. Having clarified how it structures the logic of probability assignment in terms of fundamental ingredients such as decisions, uncertain states of nature, and decision consequences, we have argued in Section 3 that the logic of the decisional perspective is not fundamentally different from typical legal decision problems, such as decisions about ultimate issues at trial. While we recognise that the application of formal decision-theoretic analyses in the law is a controversial topic in legal scholarship, we identify one root of this controversy in disagreements over the deeper point of how to understand results of formal, conceptually normative and analytical accounts, as opposed to descriptive theories of how (legal) systems actually work and of observable decision behaviour of people operating in such systems. In our view, the question is not whether or not litigants or legal processes in general are or ought to be acting in agreement with the results of formal decision-theoretic analyses. The theory (of decision) is more general: the point is that it provides a framework that allows one to subject any decision -whether it is one's own decision or that of others -to a formal analysis independently of whether or not one actually endorses the theory. The result of such analyses will not pre-empt or prescribe any particular decision, but represent advice that will add to the entire scope of considerations upon which a practical decision is based. As an aside, these analyses expose traditional discourses that treat standards of decision coarsely as purely probabilistic thresholds, as conceptually incomplete because they do not explicitly address the valuation of uncertain decision consequences, some of which may be adverse.
In conclusion, we find that the decisional perspective supports a logically sound and analytically rigorous examination of underlying threads and commonalities of key topics -i. e. probability assertion, plausibility assessment and legal conclusions about ultimate issues -that otherwise tend to be dealt with in literature either individually or in opposing ways. A better appreciation of the various concepts' respective scope of capacities and limitations should help us to use them in more defensible and complementary ways. In particular, the competing accounts' descriptive, normative and interpretative properties require careful attention, as we have shown, to avoid misconceived critiques and overinterpretation of theories beyond their domain of competence.
